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The “digital revolution” that began in the late 1960s has transformed product markets
and production processes in rich democracies. Observers depict the changes underway
as a transition from the Fordist industrial economy to a new “knowledge economy,”
characterized by rapid technological innovation and associated with a heightened
premium on higher education.1 Although the challenges of this transition are broadly
similar across the rich democracies, individual countries have navigated the course
differently.
This article compares three countries that exhibit different trajectories of change:
Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Unlike their liberal counterparts (including the
United States and the United Kingdom), all three countries feature strong social
partnership between unions and organized employers, and they are all considered
examples of coordinated market economies in the literature on varieties of capitalism.
However, despite these similarities, each has adapted differently to the challenges and
opportunities of the new knowledge economy. Germany has vigorously defended its
strength in high quality manufacturing through the digital transformation of products
and production within the traditional industrial core. Sweden, by contrast, has moved
more strongly to compete directly in high-tech sectors, especially information and
communications technologies (ICT). Finally, the Dutch have increasingly turned to
high-end business services, deploying new technologies to return to the country’s
historic strengths in trade and ﬁnance.
What accounts for these divergent trajectories? I argue that differences in the
structure of organized labor and business interests, and in the institutions that structure
their interactions with each other and with the state, produced different coalitional
alignments that have led these countries onto divergent paths toward the knowledge
economy today. In Germany, unions and employers are organized along industrial lines,
and manufacturing interests dominate the producer-group landscape on both sides of the
class divide. Market pressures since the 1970s have inspired intense cross-class
cooperation within the industrial sector and forged a formidable political alliance
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focused on defending areas of traditional strength. State policy reﬂects and reinforces
the dominance of manufacturing interests through partnerships with industries that
promote knowledge-intensive innovation within the industrial core. Sweden’s producer-
group landscape, by contrast, features more encompassing, sector-spanning interests, a
constellation that blocks strategies focused on defending particular sectors. However,
the division of blue- and white-collar interests into competing union confederations and
the growing power of salaried interests within the labor movement have allowed the
state to play a more constitutive role through policies that facilitated the consolidation of
a new coalition of white-collar unions and innovation-intensive sectors. Finally, in the
Netherlands, where national-level corporatist institutions had originally been devised to
promote industry, the collapse of traditional manufacturing in the 1970s created an
organizational vacuum. This vacuum allowed the state to actively engineer a more
fundamental shift in the dominant growth regime with policies that cemented an
unlikely alliance between blue-collar unions and high-end business services in support
of the ﬁnancialization of the Dutch political economy. In short, differences in the
interest group landscape produced different patterns of interaction between states and
organized interests from which three different patterns of state policy emerged:
supportive of a dominant coalition in Germany, enabling of an emerging coalition in
Sweden, and transformative of a new coalition in the Netherlands.
Diverging Political-Economic Proﬁles
The divergent trajectories of change in these three countries cannot be captured by any
single indicator. However, looking at relative changes in value-added in manufacturing
as a share of GDP offers a start. As Figure 1 shows, manufacturing declined in all three
countries in the 1970s and 1980s but leveled off in Germany and recovered to previous
levels after the 2007–2008 crisis. In the Netherlands, by contrast, manufacturing
dropped sharply in the 1970s and continued to decline after that. The trend for Sweden
lies in between: after a signiﬁcant drop in 1990, Swedish manufacturing rebounded, but
experienced more of a decline than in Germany after 2008.
Behind these broad trends lie signiﬁcant differences in the export proﬁles of the
three countries. The German export economy today is dominated by the very same
sectors that we have long associated with that country’s economic model. Cars continue
to play an outsized role, leading the top ten exports (volume in billions of USD) by a
wide margin, while closely related products, including vehicle parts, engine parts, and
machinery, also count among the country’s top ten exports.2
Sweden presents a more differentiated export proﬁle. The country combines
signiﬁcant exports in areas of traditional strength (cars and vehicle parts, but also raw
materials such as wood) with a strong presence in ICT-related exports such as
telecommunications and broadcasting equipment, which continue to play a signiﬁcant
role in the political economy even after the bursting of the dot com bubble.3 The
country’s well-known move into ICT is reﬂected as well in a sharp rise in employment
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in ICT manufacturing and services in the 1990s, unmatched by Germany where
employment in these areas remained ﬂat.4 As Figure 2 shows, Sweden leads all other
European countries save Finland in the number of ICT specialists employed throughout
the economy.
The Netherlands presents yet a different picture. The Dutch also experienced an
increase in employment in ICT-related areas in the 1990s, and after the 1970s what has
remained of Dutch industry is very high end—computers, telecoms, broadcasting, and
photo lab equipment are among the top ten exports.5 More importantly, however, as
Figure 3 shows, employment in business services rose steadily and rather sharply
through the 1980s and 1990s, and by 1998 came to account for over 50 percent of total
employment. Employment in FIRE industries (ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate) alone
accounted for 28 percent of total employment in 2015.6
In sum, important differences in the dominant growth regimes emerged across the
three countries in the 1980s and 1990s: Germany stayed within traditional areas of
competitive advantage, continuing to move further up market in the same sectors that
have anchored the economy for decades. Sweden and the Netherlands, by contrast,
Figure 1 Manufacturing Value Added as Percent of GDP
Source: World Bank National Accounts data and OECD National Accounts Data Files,
1969–2015. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.ZS.
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show much more movement—Sweden into higher-technology (IT) manufacturing and
services, and the Netherlands into high-end business services.
Explaining Divergent Trajectories
The dominant perspective in the literature on the comparative political economy of the
rich democracies remains the inﬂuential varieties-of-capitalism (VofC) framework.7
This work distinguishes between liberal market economies (LMEs) of the Anglo Saxon
world and the coordinated market economies (CMEs) of Europe. It expects both types
of political economies to adapt to changing market conditions by building on previous
sources of institutional advantage, reinforcing differences between LMEs and CMEs.
As such, nothing in the VofC literature could have predicted the evolution of two of
these CMEs in an apparently liberal direction, as both Sweden’s move into ICT and the
Netherlands’ move into business services are areas of economic activity closely associated
with the liberal model.
Figure 2 ICT Specialists
Source: European Commission Digital Single Market Digital Scoreboard, “DESI by components:
2b1 ICT Specialists,” 2017. https://digital-agenda-data.eu/charts/desi-components#chart5{“indicator”:
“DESI_2B1_ICTSPEC”,“breakdown-group”:“total”,“unit-measure”:“pc_ind_emp”,“time-period”:“2017”}
298
Comparative Politics January 2019
An alternative perspective highlights the role of partisan politics in the evolution of
advanced economies, locating the drivers of change in the voting public and the
representatives they elect to ofﬁce. The most important recent work in this vein, by
Beramendi and colleagues, identiﬁes four clusters corresponding to the social democratic,
Christian democratic, liberal, and southern European models.8 While illuminating the
changing electoral foundations of social policy in these countries, their work does
not explain the outcomes of interest in this article. For example, Germany and
the Netherlands are both examples of what Beramendi et al. call “status oriented
capitalism.”9 Yet the trajectories of change in the two countries’ production proﬁles
could hardly be more different.
Other lines of research are aimed at explaining the kinds of sectoral changes of
interest here. Schneider and Paunescu demonstrate that the production proﬁles of some
CMEs (including the Netherlands and Sweden) have shifted toward high tech sectors
typically associated with the liberal model.10 However, they do not pair this important
observation with an explanation of the politics behind those changes. Ornston,
by contrast, does provide such an explanation, at least for the Nordic economies.11
Figure 3 Employment Share Business Service Sector
Source: OECD Stan Indicators, 1970–2015. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode5
STANINDICATORS.
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Channeling insights from the corporatism literature, he suggests that the move into high-
innovation sectors depends on corporatist consensus-building supported by state policy.
The emphasis on the structure of organized interests and the role of the state is valuable,
but this account obscures the intense contestation across and within sectors that often
accompany these moves. Variation in the depth and character of that contestation, not
consensus, is what gives the state an opening to steer outcomes in new directions.
Finally, Baccaro and Pontusson’s analysis of growth regimes challenges consensus-
based models and, like mine, draws attention to the distributive struggles that shape
adjustment strategies.12 They draw a broad distinction between consumption-led growth
and export-led growth, characterizing Germany as an example of export-led growth
underwritten by suppression of wages (and consumption) and Sweden as a more
“balanced” growth model that combines robust domestic consumption with strong
exports. Although their outcome variable (growth) is different from mine (production
proﬁles), their analysis is relevant because they argue that Sweden’s more balanced
model “critically depended on” the shift into ICT-related manufacturing and services.13
But how exactly did Sweden make the move into ICT? On that question, Baccaro and
Pontusson’s analysis is silent, though they do suggest that to answer it, it would be
necessary to identify the speciﬁc “social blocs” that underpin different growth models.
They further suggest that such an analysis would require attention paid to both the
demand side factors they emphasize and supply side institutions such as education and
national innovation policy. I agree; this is exactly the approach I take in the analysis that
follows.
The explanation offered here thus shares with Ornston an emphasis on the structure
and strategies of organized interests and their interactions with the state. However, it
embraces Baccaro and Pontusson’s emphasis on distributive struggles both between
labor and capital and within each bloc, while taking up their invitation to identify more
precisely the speciﬁc social coalitions that lie behind divergent growth trajectories. My
analysis shows how the trajectories of change we observe were shaped by the producer
group landscape and how state policy reinforced enduring or, in some cases, emerging
coalitional alignments to set these three countries on different paths to the knowledge
economy.
The German Growth Regime: Doubling Down
Germany has long served as the exemplar of successful high-quality manufacturing
targeting the upper end of traditional markets such as automobiles and capital goods.
Debates over economic policy there center entirely on how best to defend and promote
Germany as an attractive platform for high-end (now “advanced”) manufacturing. In
comparative perspective, the most remarkable feature of the German political economy
is how little the country’s product proﬁle has changed over the postwar period.
Maintaining its commanding position in sectors like automobiles and machine tools
is by no means a matter of inertia; this is an outcome that has to be actively defended
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and that has involved weathering a tremendous onslaught from both lower-cost producers
and new entrants into the high-end markets that German producers have dominated for
decades. Yet the German export machine has rarely looked stronger or more dominant.
Exports make up a huge share of GDP, and Germany runs large trade surpluses year
after year.14
The successful defense of the traditional core of German manufacturing is largely
the work of a cross-class coalition within industry that is ideally conﬁgured and situated
to defend and enhance these areas of strength. Both German unions and German
employers are organized along sectoral lines, with weak overarching institutions and no
serious crosscutting cleavages. On the union side, organization levels in manufacturing
far outstrip those in services, and the metalworkers union (IG Metall) is by far the
dominant actor. The largest of Germany’s eight unions, it has never faced an effective
counterweight; the overarching trade union confederation has no inﬂuence over the
constituent unions. Public sector unions are formidable players in many advanced
industrial countries, but the public sector in Germany is small by European standards.15
Finally, blue- and white-collar employees within a sector are organized into the same
union, their fates jointly tied together and to the success of that sector.
The organization of German business mirrors that of unions. The employer associations
that negotiate with labor are industry-based, and sectoral trade associations represent their
interests politically. Moreover, unlike their conglomerate counterparts in Sweden, large
German ﬁrms tend to be anchored in particular sectors (think of Daimler, VW, or
BMW).16 The same is true for Germany’s powerful Mittelstand (small- and medium-
sized companies), which is composed of ﬁrms whose fortunes are usually tied to
particular industries (and sometimes, as suppliers, even to particular clients).
In short, manufacturing interests in Germany are tightly organized within particular
industries and sectors. They are neither embedded in more encompassing associations
nor forced to share power with similarly inﬂuential actors in other sectors. As the
economy’s unrivaled growth engine, industry enjoys outsized inﬂuence not just in the
economy but in policymaking circles as well. These arrangements have helped forge an
ironclad alliance in defense of long-standing sectoral strengths through both aggres-
sive cost cutting and active adaptation of traditional institutional arrangements to
new product markets and production technologies. The key developments in industrial
relations, labor market policy, education/training, and innovation policy are outlined
below.
In industrial relations, cross-class cooperation within the manufacturing core has
intensiﬁed since the 1980s in response to heightened market pressures. Powerful works
councils and managers have worked together over the past decades to control costs,
outsourcing low-skill services previously performed in-house, and deploying temps and
ﬁxed-term workers to cover short-term cycles.17 Manufacturing unions and employers
stood together to defend the principle of collective bargaining autonomy (i.e., non-state
involvement) despite union weakness outside of manufacturing and the massive growth
of low-wage work in the 2000s.18 It is an open secret that Germany’s industrial unions
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were initially reluctant to support the introduction of a statutory minimum wage, fearing
that this would produce downward pressure in their own wage negotiations.
Government policy reﬂects and reinforces the dominance of manufacturing
interests. Labor market policies since the 1990s have stabilized employment for skilled
manufacturing employees, even as they made work outside the protected core more
ﬂexible. The Hartz reforms of the early 2000s liberalized labor markets by slashing
unemployment beneﬁts and loosening restrictions on various forms of atypical work.
However, even as government policy liberalized atypical employment, other measures
speciﬁcally shielded skilled industrial workers from the vicissitudes of the market. In
the turbulent years of 2008–2009, the government passed three successive bills to
extend the length and generosity of subsidies to ﬁrms wishing to avoid laying off their
skilled workers (Kurzarbeit). Although employment in industry has fallen to about 20
percent of total employment in Germany, 80 percent of these subsidies went to workers
in the manufacturing core. The metalworking sector collected the lion’s share, and funds
ﬂowed disproportionately to two states (Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Bavaria) that lie at the
heart of the German industrial export regime.19 The government’s “cash for clunkers”
program (Abwrackpra¨mie) sent a special lifeline to the car industry, causing a mini-
boom for German automakers in the midst of the global crisis.20
Cost control strategies have been important in adjusting to a knowledge economy,
but it would be a mistake to attribute the continued success of German industry solely,
or even primarily, to wage suppression.21 Instead, continued success has involved the
ongoing active adaptation of traditional political-economic arrangements to a rapidly
evolving market context. In a period of explosive technological change, this especially
applies to education and training. Governments in most other countries have responded
to the increasing importance of high-end (especially engineering) skills by promoting
higher education. However, in Germany, high-quality manufacturing has always relied
heavily on ﬁrm-based vocational training, so employers and unions have worked
together to upgrade the quality of such training as production becomes ever more
knowledge-intensive.22
However, advanced manufacturing increasingly requires theoretical skills that ﬁrms
themselves cannot provide efﬁciently. Thus, a further challenge has been to continue to
attract the brightest students into industry while forestalling the drift toward what
German employers consider “overly academic” training. The solution manufacturers
have hit upon is to pursue partnerships with regional universities of applied sciences
(Fachhochschulen) to create new and more demanding (also more theoretical)
apprenticeships that confer, simultaneously, vocational certiﬁcates and bachelors’
degrees. Top students are indeed drawn to these “dual study” programs, not just for the
double certiﬁcation but also because unlike “regular” university students they receive a
wage (as apprentices) during their studies.23 Crucially, access to these highly prized
dual-study programs runs exclusively through companies; youth cannot apply directly
but instead must be hired as apprentices by participating ﬁrms. Thus, rather than
softening the line between vocational and university tracks as is occurring in most other
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countries, developments in Germany instead subsume part of the higher education
system to the ﬁrm-dominated logic of the traditional vocational system.24
The continued draw of the vocational system explains why academic higher
education remains so dramatically underdeveloped in Germany. Figure 4 compares
university completion rates for two generations. While most of the other rich democracies
record large increases in tertiary completion rates among the younger cohort, Germany
shows very modest movement.
Finally, the continued domination of manufacturing interests is on display in
Germany’s innovation policy. A national-level tripartite “Alliance for the Future of
Industry” includes policy makers and representatives of all the main manufacturing
interests. The express goal is to defend Germany’s position as an industrial power
(Industrie Standort Deutschland) and to secure the competitiveness of German
manufacturing in the digital era.25 At the center of German innovation policy is an
ambitious strategic initiative, Industrie 4.0 (signaling the fourth industrial revolu-
tion), that involves major investments in research by government, universities, and
companies. As a result of ongoing innovation within the industrial core, Germany has
Figure 4 Population with Tertiary Education 2016, 25–34 year olds/55–64 year olds
OECD Data, “Population with tertiary education,” 2016. https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-
with-tertiary-education.htm.
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become a world leader in “internet of things” (IoT) and machine-to-machine (M2M)
communication.26 Although Industrie 4.0 is one of several “future projects” in
Germany’s “High Tech 2020” strategy, it is clearly the most important, receiving the
lion’s share of resources and attracting the greatest attention. For present purposes, what
is as striking as the futuristic ambitions of this project is the cast of characters charged
with implementing it, which reads like a who’s who of the oldest and most inﬂuential
actors in German economic history. The steering committee includes such nineteenth-
century power brokers as the Trade Association for Mechanical Engineering (VDMA),
the Federation of German Industry (BDI), the Manufacturers’ Association for the
Electrical Industry (ZVEI), the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA),
and of course the IG Metall.
In sum, Germany’s transition to the knowledge economy has not represented a
sharp departure from traditional strengths, but instead a (so far extremely successful)
doubling down on strategies supporting ever higher quality and increasingly digitized
manufacturing. The developments outlined above reinforce the continued dominance of
industrial interests in the German political economy, placing them at the center of the
country’s growth strategy for the knowledge economy.
The Swedish Growth Regime: Branching Out
Sweden’s postwar growth regime centered on many of the same export industries as
Germany. However, manufacturing interests in Sweden compete for inﬂuence within a
much denser organizational space where the relevant producer groups span sectors in
ways that complicated the defense of particular ﬁrms and industries.
On the labor side, union density far exceeds that of Germany; Swedish unions have
a stronger presence among both low-skill service workers and high-skill salaried
employees. Manufacturing interests are powerful, but they are imbricated in associations
that are both encompassing and crosscutting. Thus unlike its German counterpart,
Sweden’s main manufacturing union IF Metall is part of a broader blue-collar
confederation that includes workers in other sectors, including low-skill services. IF
Metall must also coordinate with white-collar unions in manufacturing that are themselves
part of separate confederations of salaried employees, which have grown in size and
strength with the shift in employment to services.
On the employer side, Swedish business interests are more concentrated and more
diversiﬁed than in Germany. They are more concentrated because Sweden lacks an
equivalent to Germany’s politically inﬂuential Mittelstand. Instead, the economy
historically has been dominated by a handful of large business groups, among them the
vast Wallenberg dynasty, whose companies accounted for 10 percent of all private
sector employment in Sweden in the 1970s.27 Today, the holdings of the top ﬁfteen
families in Sweden comprise 70 percent of the Stockholm exchange, and Sweden’s two
biggest business groups together hold controlling shares in thirteen of the country’s
twenty-ﬁve largest companies.28
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Swedish business interests are also more diversiﬁed than their German counterparts,
which, as we saw, tend to be rooted in particular industries. By contrast, Sweden’s
business groups have a presence across a wide range of sectors, spanning manufacturing
and services and even export and domestic markets. For example, the Wallenbergs have
major holdings in traditional manufacturing (e.g., ball bearings and appliances), but also
in banking and ICT, and even education and healthcare. The country’s second largest
business group, Handelsbanken, has a similarly broad portfolio.29 Some prominent ﬁrms
whose operations span different sectors have dual memberships in separate employer
associations for industry and for services. For example, Ericsson is the largest member of
the ICT group in the service employers’ association Almega, but also belongs to the
industry association Verkstadsfo¨reningen. Other cross-over companies include Kinnevik
(telecommunications with roots in paper mills) and Industriva¨rden (active in banking, but
also manufacturing, paper, and forest products, plus domestic and tradable services).
The very different producer group landscape in Sweden supported a pattern of
adjustment quite different from that of Germany. Stronger union presence outside
manufacturing blocked German-style dualization, and indeed white-collar membership
grew to outnumber blue-collar with the long-term shift in employment toward services.
Sweden’s business groups responded to market pressures by reshufﬂing their portfolios,
exiting sectors such as automobiles, and moving upmarket into more knowledge-
intensive manufacturing and services.30 In the 1990s, Saab and Volvo passed into
foreign hands, moves that in Germany surely would have triggered a spirited cross-class
defense of treasured national symbols. However, in Sweden these events occurred
without much drama, as business groups shifted resources into growth ﬁelds and the
center of gravity in the labor movement began to tilt toward white-collar interests.
The move into ICT was led by a few key ﬁrms, most notably Ericsson, which
wielded outsized inﬂuence both in the market and in politics.31 The conservative
government of 1990–1994 strongly supported the move into high technology markets
through supply-side interventions—especially in education and innovation policy—and
found ready allies both in Sweden’s most inﬂuential business groups and in the
expanding white-collar unions. The following paragraphs sketch out the relevant
developments in four key arenas.
Major changes in industrial relations began in 1983 with the collapse of peak-level
wage negotiations, a move that reﬂected the waning leadership of the blue-collar trade
union confederation (LO). Wage decentralization in Sweden went beyond the widely
known move from national-level to industry-level bargaining, allowing more room for
local wage setting. Employers sought such decentralized bargaining for the wage
ﬂexibility it offered, but unions of salaried professionals also favored local wage
formation to address their members’ demand for pay that reﬂected their investments in
education and skills.32
Wage decentralization exacerbated tensions between Sweden’s blue- and white-
collar confederations, and it also inspired competition between the two white-collar
confederations whose members compete for status and jobs. Members of the academic/
professional unions within the smaller Confederation of Professional Associations
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(SACO) are already university graduates. However, the same is not true for members of
the larger Confederation of Salaried Employees (TCO), which, since the 1990s, has
made increased access to higher education its number one priority. Merit- and
education-based wage differentiation thus heightened demand for changes in state
education policy. German-style (ﬁrm-based) apprenticeship had been eliminated decades
before, but two-year vocational tracks continued to exist alongside three-year academic
tracks in Swedish high schools. In 1991, the government passed a major reform,
implemented over the next few years, that eliminated the two-year track and opened the
path to university studies to all.33 The government also increased spending on education
from 5.3 percent of GDP in 1990 to 7.4 percent by 2000, and doubled spending on higher
education speciﬁcally (from 1 percent of GDP to 2 percent in this period).34 As Figure 4
indicated, Sweden registered a very large increase in completion of tertiary education and
surpassed the United States by 2009.
Unlike in Germany, Sweden’s labor market policy focused on easing the transition
away from the traditional manufacturing core rather than on preserving it. During the
1980s, Swedish labor market policies had drifted toward defensive job-preserving
measures,35 but the conservative government of the early 1990s answered a sharp and
unprecedented rise in unemployment with a massive expansion of active labor market
policies. Spending on ALMP rose from 1.7 to 2.6 percent of GDP, and by the time the
conservatives left ofﬁce in 1994, fully 7.3 percent of the total labor force was engaged in
ALMP programs. The subsequent social democratic government continued these
policies. Over the entire 1992–1997 period, ALMP expenditures as a share of total
public expenditure and GDP was higher in Sweden than in any other OECD country,
especially after adjusting for the rate of unemployment.36
While labor market policies eased the transition out of traditional manufacturing,
state innovation policy actively promoted the move into ICT. Prime Minister Carl Bildt,
an early advocate (and well-known “computer freak”) convened a government commission
in 1993 that laid out a comprehensive plan for Sweden to become a leading player in the
IT sector.37 However, in a feature that is hard to square with Ornston’s picture of
consensus-based change, the commission did not include a single representative of
Sweden’s producer groups. It was instead composed of top executives from six ﬁrms
that were all active in the telecommunications or computer software industries
(including notably Ericsson’s CEO), alongside experts from academia.38 Sweden’s
innovation policy, unlike that of Germany, focused on infrastructure and especially
users of IT rather than manufacturers.39 The commission’s report, with the evocative
title “Wings to Human Ability,” recommended introducing computers into classrooms
across Sweden, educating teachers in technology, and encouraging the integration of IT
into instruction at all levels.40 The government ﬁnanced these efforts by redirecting the
defunct wage earner funds that had originally been intended to achieve collective
ownership.41
Swedish unions got on board after the conservative government left ofﬁce and
played a key role in disseminating IT technology and skills. Recognizing that computer
literacy would be crucial to their members’ employment prospects, the LO and TCO
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began to negotiate steep volume discounts from PC suppliers that they passed on to their
members.42 A large number of Swedish employees acquired their ﬁrst home computer in
this way.43 The Swedish employee PC purchase schemes were wildly popular, and in
1997 political parties from both the right and left supported a measure to make these
purchases tax-free. Thus developed “a three-party collaboration between the state,
employers and unions” that resulted in a dramatic expansion of the number of Swedish
households with a computer and internet access.44 The biggest increase occurred between
1996 and 2000, and by 2006, almost 1.6 million of Sweden’s 4.3 million households had
taken advantage of the Home PC program.45 The program is now “considered a major
reason for the rapid and, in an international comparison, early diffusion of PCs among
Swedish households,” and credited with having played an important role in Sweden’s ICT
transformation by providing a “great lift in digital literacy.”46
The Social Democratic government of the late 1990s complemented these
initiatives with policies to expand ICT skills within the general population (i.e., beyond
the constituencies served by the union-based initiatives). The “Knowledge Lift” (KL)
program of 1997–2002 offered training at existing adult education centers, and computer
science was an especially popular subject in each of the ﬁve years the program ran. A
separate program from 1998 to 2000, “Swedish Information and Technology” (SWIT),
promoted IT skills speciﬁcally.47
These supply-side developments are crucial to explaining the Swedish ICT boom.
Not only does Sweden feature an exceptionally large number of ICT specialists; the
digital skills of the country’s population as a whole are at or near the top of all EU
countries.48 The success of the Swedish gaming industry, as well as ﬁrms such as Skype
and Spotify, are partly a function of the fact that the country has a population that
consists of very sophisticated consumers (as well as producers) of ICT.49
In sum, while Germany was doubling down in its traditional areas of manufacturing
strength, Sweden moved into higher technology manufacturing and services. State
policy played a key role in promoting ICT, but the producer group landscape was
critically important in facilitating a shift in Sweden’s growth regime. The crosscutting
interests of key producer group actors in Sweden prevented the emergence of a sector-
based cross-class alliance of the sort that dominates the German political economy.
Diversiﬁed business groups faced strong incentives to shift resources into more
knowledge-intensive activities, and Ericsson played a central role, functioning “as an
organizational and technological hub both within the ICT sector and between new and
traditional industries in Sweden.”50 State policy actively promoted the move upmarket
through policies that also reinforced the shift in the balance of power within the labor
movement away from the blue-collar LO and toward white-collar unions.
The Dutch Growth Regime: Transitioning Back
Meanwhile, of the three countries considered here, the Netherlands has shifted the
furthest, at least from its goals of the immediate post-war period. The institutions of
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Dutch corporatism had been expressly created in the 1940s to promote manufacturing to
transform the country “from an agricultural into an industrial economy.”51 However,
industrial development in the 1950s and 1960s was premised on low-cost strategies that
became unsustainable in the 1970s when revenues from natural resources caused a steep
appreciation of the Dutch currency. The collapse of Dutch manufacturing created an
organizational vacuum within the institutions of Dutch corporatism, allowing the state
to engineer a more dramatic reconﬁguration of the country’s growth model, one that has
come to be premised on a new “owner-worker” alliance.52
Producer groups in the Netherlands in the immediate post-war period closely
resembled those in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, with unions dominated by blue-
collar workers and manufacturing interests enjoying privileged access to government.
Unlike in Germany, however, Dutch social partnership relied more heavily on direct
state support through the government’s regular use of extension clauses to massively
amplify the reach of union contracts.53
The institutions of corporatism that had been created to promote manufacturing
survived its collapse. However, the goals and functions of the heralded Polder model
were transformed in the 1980s as the government turned toward services and as social
partnership came to revolve around negotiating an orderly retreat from manufacturing,
especially via early retirement. Unions are full partners in the joint management of
occupational pension funds, which grew over the 1990s from “sleepy bureaucratic”
investors into “prominent ﬁnancial institutions in their own right.”54 These developments
transformed union interests, paving the way for the consolidation of a new worker-owner
alliance around ﬁnance and international business services. Again, I review the most
signiﬁcant changes in industrial relations, labor market policy, education, and innovation
policy.
Industrial relations in the 1970s and 1980s were still dominated by manufacturing
interests and were largely devoted to negotiating the terms on which industrial
downsizing would occur. In Germany, the adjustments of the 1970s and early 1980s had
left manufacturing leaner but also more competitive, while in the Netherlands
manufacturing continued its decline. Membership in Dutch unions plummeted to
below 20 percent, and the country’s leading ﬁrms (including Philips, Shell, and
Unilever) turned toward global expansion and diversiﬁcation. With collective bargaining
centered on industrial retrenchment and downsizing, supplemental “second tier”
(collectively bargained) pensions became a major theme in industrial relations. Thanks
to a 1949 law that allowed the Ministry of Social Affairs to declare occupational
pensions negotiated at the industry level compulsory for all ﬁrms in the sector, 90
percent of Dutch wage earners participate in industry-wide funds co-managed by the
social partners.55
On the employer side, the collapse of the heavily subsidized Rijn-Schelde-Verolme
shipyards in 1983 spelled “an end to the old industry policy.”56 The Ministry of
Economic Affairs, which had previously interacted directly with leading manufacturers,
now distanced itself and downgraded its Department of Industry. Within top
government circles, new voices emphatically argued against intervening on behalf of
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industry and advocated a turn toward services.57 The Dutch insurance industry
(comprised of ABN, Rabo, ING, and Aegon) became increasingly inﬂuential in this
period, and the Dutch temporary agency ﬁrm Randstad grew mightily to become the
second largest player in the industry worldwide.58
Labor market policy in these years began to reﬂect and reinforce the changed
economic landscape as the government retreated from policies aimed at preserving
manufacturing and promoted service employment instead. In part prompted by EU
mandates, the government encouraged the entry of women into the labor market by
removing some of the discriminatory policies (e.g., in the tax code) that had traditionally
discouraged female employment—changes that coincided with a reduction in beneﬁts
for their under- or unemployed husbands.59 Within a single generation the Netherlands
experienced a very signiﬁcant increase in female labor market participation.60 Dutch
women who had not expected to enter the paid workforce had mostly opted for the
general rather than vocational track in upper secondary school, and thus entered the
labor market with exactly the kind of skills (e.g., foreign languages) that service ﬁrms
sought. The lack of public day care in this Christian Democratic country meant that
most women worked part-time, but this did not pose a problem for the service
industries they entered, where scheduling was anyway more ﬂuid than in traditional
manufacturing sectors.
Unions, initially skeptical about the rise in part-time employment, changed their
tune in the early 1990s as growing levels of household debt rendered many families
dependent on that second income to make their mortgage payments.61 This shift brought
their interests into alignment with those of service ﬁrms who valued the ﬂexibility of
part-time work. A major corporatist bargain in 1993 resulted in legislation upgrading the
status and beneﬁts of part-time work by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
working hours and ensuring equal treatment in wages, overtime pay, holidays, bonuses,
occupational pensions, and training.62
The government’s innovation policy further reﬂected and reinforced the growing
inﬂuence of business services. A 1996 government report advocated using resources
from the “old economy” (i.e., the exploitation of natural gas), to support the transition
toward the “knowledge economy.”63 Marja Wagenaar, social democratic MP from 1997
to 2002, emphasized “huge demand” on the part of the country’s internationally
oriented industry and ﬁnance sectors to use the gas revenues to develop a high quality
glass-ﬁber ICT network.64 So, at about the same time that the Swedes were investing in
the dissemination of IT skills, the Dutch focused on IT infrastructure beginning with the
construction of a vast IT network (1996–1998), continuing with policies promoting the
widespread use of ICT (1998–2001), and ﬁnally extending its application (beginning in
2001).65 The Netherlands emerged from these initiatives as a leader in e-health, e-
education, and e-government. By 2013 it also led all other EU countries in the number
of households with access to the internet at home, as well as in usage rates among its
citizens.66
The move into knowledge-intensive business services was also accompanied and
supported by important reforms to the education system. While Germany was avoiding
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a break with traditional ﬁrm-based VET, the Dutch state was engaged in reforms that
promoted the kind of general skills that most observers see as central to the development
of services, especially high-end services.67 While Germany continues to valorize
practical training and discourage overly “bookish” studies, the Dutch government began
favoring general education, arguing that while “practical skills can be relatively easily
acquired” during an employee’s working life, “gaps in basic knowledge are difﬁcult to
make up later.”68
Thus, and again unlike in Germany, there has been a very signiﬁcant increase in
university attendance in the Netherlands, which over the past generation has nearly
caught up to the U.S. As Figure 4 showed, the trend in tertiary educational attainment in
the Netherlands tracks rather closely with developments in Sweden, with large increases
beginning in the 1990s. Changes in education in turn fueled steep increases in
employment across a range of professional services between 1994 and 2008 as
employment in lower-skill jobs shrank.69
Dutch unions continue to over-represent male manufacturing workers, but the
transition out of manufacturing itself tied them closer to services and ultimately to
ﬁnancial services. One contributing factor, already noted, is the widespread dependence
of households on 1.5 incomes (thus also women’s employment) in a country characterized
by extremely high consumer debt.70 However, the bigger part of the story is the pension
funds that are co-managed by the unions. Dutch pension funds are truly massive,
amounting in 2012 to 160 percent of the country’s GDP (compared to German and
Swedish pension funds, which account for a mere 6.3 percent and 9.2 percent of GDP,
respectively).71
As Dutch pension funds grew to become large institutional investors operating on a
global scale, unions became reliable allies in the ﬁnancialization of the Dutch
economy.72 A senior policy ofﬁcer within the Dutch Social-Economic Council (SER)
emphasizes the way in which joint pension management stabilizes Dutch corporatism:
“The joint management of sector-wide pension funds is an important foundation of the
institutional strength of Dutch unions.”73 He notes that their shared stake in the health of
the second-tier pensions means that the social partners work together in this area “on an
intense and ongoing basis.”
These dynamics explain the very different reactions of the Germans and Dutch to
the ﬁnancial crisis of the late 2000s. In Germany the crisis mobilized a cross-class
coalition of corporate insiders (managers and unions) against (ﬁnancial) outsiders, while
in the Netherlands, an alternative “worker-owner” coalition (unions 1 ﬁnancial
interests) dampened pressure for stricter regulation, not as a matter of regulatory capture
but instead of “consensual politics.”74
The transition into knowledge-intensive business services and ﬁnance represents,
thus, a signiﬁcant change in the Dutch political economy, especially when compared to
the low-cost industrial strategies the country was pursuing in the 1950s and 1960s. In a
phrase that no German policy-maker would ever utter, a representative of the Dutch
Education Ministry says: “We think of ourselves as a service economy—ﬁnance and
services.”75 The collapse of Dutch manufacturing in the 1970s had dramatically altered
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the producer group landscape even as the path out of manufacturing laid the
groundwork for a new cross-class coalition by transforming Dutch workers into
owners.76 The venerable Polder model did not break down, but it was signiﬁcantly
reconﬁgured and came increasingly to serve FIRE industries.
Conclusion
This article has documented the political underpinnings of three quite different pathways
toward a knowledge economy. The German case stands out for the remarkable continuity
in the composition of economic activity, even as traditional products and production
processes are being revolutionized by digital technologies. In this case, a powerful and
resilient cross-class coalition in manufacturing, supported and reinforced by state policy, is
presiding over the transition to the knowledge economy.
Sweden has seen a series of subtler changes as many of the same business
conglomerates that dominated the postwar growth regime have transitioned into different
types of economic activity. Encompassing unions and crosscutting cleavages mitigated
German-style dualism, facilitating a shift in resources into higher value added markets in
both manufacturing and services. Here state policy served as a midwife, assisting the
move up market through innovation and education policies that created the infrastructure
within which knowledge-intensive ﬁrms could thrive, while further enhancing the
already-growing size and power of salaried employees within the labor movement.
The Netherlands, ﬁnally, has witnessed a more profound shift, as the collapse of the
original low-cost manufacturing strategy paved the way for a more signiﬁcant
coalitional realignment to occur within the traditional institutions of social partnership.
In this case, active government support for the transition to services and the evolution of
organized labor’s interests laid the foundation for a redirection of the Dutch political
economy back to its historic strengths in trade and ﬁnance, though now in a decidedly
higher-tech direction.
The three trajectories of change outlined here do not exhaust all possible routes
toward a knowledge economy transition; other countries may chart different courses
depending on the political dynamics and coalitions. Moreover, all three of the pathways
documented here appear to be economically viable in sense of producing growth, at
least in medium run. However, each is vulnerable to somewhat different pathologies and
associated with different distributional outcomes. Germany’s manufacturing-based
export-led growth is wildly successful in international markets. However, the continued
emphasis on traditional sectors like automobiles still leaves German producers exposed
to relentless cost pressures that are unlikely to let up, and that have already contributed
to a growing divide between labor market insiders and outsiders. Thus, despite its
enviable trade surplus, the German political economy has also seen higher levels of low-
wage work and poverty.
The Swedish growth regime is more complex and to some observers more
balanced.77 While it is true that the economy is performing well on many levels, the
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changes described above have set in motion potentially unsettling dynamics. High union
coverage among low-skill workers has placed a more solid ﬂoor on downward wage
pressures, but inequality in Sweden at the upper end of the income spectrum has risen as
white collar interests have grown in size and strength. Employers have seized on these
developments, attempting to sideline the blue-collar confederation (LO) entirely, which,
if successful, would have a profound effect on Sweden’s hitherto relatively egalitarian
model of capitalism.
Finally, the Dutch growth regime also has its strengths, including, among other
things, vastly improved levels of female labor market participation in a country that was
once a spectacular laggard on this score. At the same time, however, the growing role of
ﬁnance renders the Dutch political economy vulnerable to some of the pathologies that
we have traditionally associated with liberal market economies such as the United
States, including boom-bust-bubble dynamics and a further weakening and fragmen-
tation of unions. As Engelen et al. have pointed out, the Netherlands is an extreme
outlier in the context of the varieties-of-capitalism literature, combining as it does high
coordination with high ﬁnancialization.78 It remains to be seen how stable that
combination will prove over the longer run.
Stepping back from the three countries explored in this article, two further
overarching conclusions come into view. The ﬁrst, wholly consistent with one of the
core messages of the original varieties-of-capitalism framework, is that the shared
pressures of technological change are unlikely to result in convergence on a single
dominant model of capitalism. Second, the distinct trajectories that we have observed
across these three coordinated market economies—including in some cases moves into
areas of strength we have traditionally associated with the liberal model—suggest limits
to the capacity of the VofC framework as originally conceived to capture current
developments. My analysis suggests that a more dynamic understanding of political-
economic resilience and change requires a shift in attention from the speciﬁc
arrangements that support different models of capitalism to the changing political
coalitions on which these models rest.
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